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CHARACTER ETHICS AND MORAL WISDOM1
Robert C. Roberts

A particular conception of the enterprise of character ethics is proposed, in
which the central preoccupation of the discipline is to explore the logical-psychological features of particular virtues. An attraction of this approach is the
prospect it holds out of promoting in its practitioners and readers the virtue of
moral wisdom. Such analysis is sensitive to differences among moral traditions
which imply differences in the logical-psychological features of versions of
types of virtues. Thus Christian generosity could be expected to have some features which differentiate it from Aristotelian or Stoic generosity. On the proposed view, the aim is not to produce a theory of the virtues which, it is argued,
is likely to be reductivist and thus systematically distorting. Instead, the aim is
produce "grammatical" analyses of them. To this end a series of open-ended
questions are provided, to guide the exploration. The method is illustrated by a
schematic analysis of the virtue of gratitude. The paper ends with remarks
about the power and limits of such analysis to produce moral wisdom.

Introduction

When I was younger, my conscience was often uneasy about doing philosophy. It was fascinating, stimulating, a context for showing conceptual
ingenuity, affording, from time to time, the kind of satisfaction that I imagine good chess players feel when with unusual flair they polish off a challenging opponent. But where was it all going? Could philosophy be, in
any serious sense, a contribution to human life? Was it any more than a
private amusement for me and my intellectual friends? Might I do myself,
or anybody else, any good by pursuing philosophy? Its institutional backing reassured me a little: People who had some talent for it could be paid
to study it under the supervision of highly intelligent people at great universities; and persons who showed cleverness and perseverance there
might draw a salary the rest of their lives for teaching other people to do it.
Surely these institutions would never have been set up for philosophy if
somebody hadn't seen some intrinsic or instrumental value in it. I was also
reassured by the historical veneration received by such greats as Plato and
Aristotle, Leibniz, Kant, and Wittgenstein. Surely so much of history cannot have been daftly misguided.
But such external reassurances served poorly my moral comfort. With
ambivalence that continued right into the early years of my teaching caFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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reer, I allayed my uneasiness a little by focusing philosophical activity on
ethics and religion. Ethics, surely, was central to the life of every day and
everyone. The philosophical ethics I grew up with, and later subjected my
students to, was dominated by questions about the foundations of obligation and the semantic status of ethical discourse. I taught my students
about the nature and application of the categorical imperative and the
problems it faces. We rehearsed the versions of utilitarianism and their
theoretical problems; and we looked at social contract theory and divine
command theory and pursued the questions of "meta-ethics": Are ethical
sentences fact-claiming? Or merely expressions of preference? Or universal prescriptions? Or what? And if they do make any non-subjective factual claim, what kind of claim is it, and is it plausible?
These discussions struck both me and my students as ethically arid,
though the brighter of my students liked the intellectual sport and took it
from me that the questions must be important. And I delighted ambivalently in the subtleties of the discussion and took it from the philosophical
establishment that the discussion must be important. It was about this
time that Bernard Williams remarked, in the Preface to his little book
Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, that "Contemporary moral philosophy
has found an original way of being boring, which is by not discussing
moral issues at all."2
Reacting, I think, to the aridity and irrelevance of this kind of moral philosophy, thinkers took increasing interest in applying their critical and constructive skills in two "new" areas of ethics. One was that of practical ethical
problems such as arise in medicine, biological science, business, the military,
race and gender relations, and so forth. Here it seemed that philosophers
might apply their special talents and skills to the actual improvement of ethical decisions. The other area was that of the character and moral psychology
of individuals and communities. Inquiry into character, too, seemed to hold
out a promise of usefulness. If problem-centered ethical inquiry might improve public policy and individual decision-making, perhaps character
ethics could be hoped somehow to improve people's character.

Wisdom as an Aim of Moral Philosophy
One moral effect that I have hoped for from inquiries in the ethics of
character is the formation of practical or moral wisdom. Wisdom in this
sense is a rather rare kind of heartfelt and articulate knowledge of what is
morally good for people. It is articulate in two senses. It is a power of
discernment in the details of the moral life - not just a mastery of broad
principles, or a capacity to think abstractly about morality, but an ability to
think clearly and justly and concretely about the joints of the moral life that
are indicated by such words as 'justice,' 'anxiety,' 'generosity,' 'happiness,'
'trust,' 'humility,' 'shame,' 'self-contro!,' 'guilt,' 'despair,' 'gratitude,'
'friend,' and many others. Thus moral wisdom descends to the particulars,
to the actual problems of living, following the articulations of the moral life
in ways that pinch and form and edify people who explore them. It is also
articulate in the less original but more ordinary sense of the word: The person of moral wisdom not only understands moral geography in some
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detail, but is able to talk or write clearly about it, and so is fit in some small
way to pass his wisdom on to others.
In the same Preface from which I just quoted, Williams goes on to say,
Certainly the trouble is not, as some pretend, that if the philosopher
is not patently detached and even methodological, then he must be
preaching; that cannot possibly be the only alternative. It is rather a
stylistic problem, in the deepest sense of 'style' in which to discover
the right style is to discover what you are really trying to do (p.xi).
One can think of the present paper as an essay on philosophical style, an
effort to discover and articulate just what I want to do as a moral philosopher. You will discover that I am less cautious about keeping the moral
philosopher from preaching than Williams is; though philosophical preaching (and philosophical pastoral work in general) will have its distinctives.
And I'm willing to introduce a bit of procedure into the pursuit of moral
wisdom, without fear that it will objectify ethics to the point of evaporating
its subject-matter.
Let me give some historical examples of what I have called moral wisdom. Socrates seems to have been a wise man in this sense. Most of the
words that Plato attributes to him do not particularly show the tendency;
but it is indicated when Socrates describes his daily mission in the marketplace as that of trying to teach people "to make your first and chief concern
not for your bodies nor for your possessions, but for the highest welfare of
your souls" (Apology 30b, translated by Hugh Tredennick3) and when
A1cibiades declares that Socrates
talks about pack asses and blacksmiths and shoemakers and tanners,
and he always seems to be saying the same old thing in just the same
old way, so that anyone who wasn't used to his style and wasn't very
quick on the uptake would naturally take it for the most utter nonsense. But if you open up his arguments, and really get into the skin
of them, you'll find that they're the only arguments in the world that
have any sense at all and that nobody else's are so godlike, so rich in
images of virtue, or so ... entirely pertinent to those inquiries that help
the seeker on his way to the goal of true nobility (Symposium 221 e222a, translated by Michael Joyce ').
The Stoics were of course specialists in this kind of wisdom (see, for example, the Enchiridion of Epictetus, the moral epistles of Seneca). Thomas
Aquinas'S style is perhaps not optimally edifying, but his discussions of the
virtues and vices contain some examples of insights such as I have in mind.
The following thoughts can be found in his question on the virtue of liberality in his Summa Theologia', Second Part of the Second Part, Question 117:
"Generosity ... has its being not in the amount given but in the disposition of the giver," "The sentiment is what determines whether a
gift is handsome or niggardly and gives the gift its value." Generosity or the lack thereof is indicated by such passions as "pleasure or
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sorrow with regard to what is given." Motives like the desire to
show off, or the desire to help someone rob others, rule out the generosity of an act; a motive essential for generosity is the well-being of
others. The generous person is free from undue attachment to what
he or she gives away, but the generous person "knows the value of
money." "The more indebtedness there is, the less is payment an act
of generosity."s As just, one gives another what belongs to the other;
as generous, one gives another what belongs to oneself.
Samuel Johnson's Rambler essays" display the kind of wisdom I am thinking of:
The understanding of a man, naturally sanguine, may indeed be
easily vitiated by the luxurious indulgence of hope, however necessary to the production of everything great or excellent, as some plants
are destroyed by too open exposure to that sun which gives life and
beauty to the vegetable world ("On Looking Into Futurity").
The great art, therefore, of piety, and the end for which all religious rites seem to be instituted, is the perpetual renovation of the
motives to virtue by a voluntary employment of our mind in the contemplation of its excellence, its importance, and its necessity, which,
in proportion as they are more frequently and more willingly revolved, gain a more forcible and permanent influence till in time they
become the reigning ideas and standing principles of action and the
test by which everything proposed to the judgment is rejected or
approved ("Uses of Retirement").
A frequent and attentive prospect of that moment which must put
a period to all our schemes and deprive us of all our acquisitions is
indeed of the utmost efficacy to the just and rational regulation of our
lives; nor would ever anything wicked, or often anything absurd, be
undertaken or prosecuted by him who should begin every day with a
serious reflection that he is born to die ("Contemplation of Death").
The moral interests and judgment evident in such novels as George Eliot's
Middlemarch and The Mill on the Floss make them another example of what I
have in mind. A young outsider to Middlemarch, Tertius Lydgate, is trying to establish a medical practice there. He finds himself caught in the
local politics of religious factions, and is forced to vote on whether to
remove a perfectly good hospital chaplain so as to replace him with an
evangelical. The one designated for ouster, the Rev. Camden Farebrother,
warns him about inconvenient consequences if Lydgate takes his side. In
this connection, Eliot narrates some impressive moral reflection:
That, entering into Lydgate's position as a newcomer who had his
own professional objects to secure, Mr. Farebrother should have
taken pains rather to warn off than to obtain his interest, showed an
unusual delicacy and generosity, which Lydgate's nature was keenly
alive to. It went along with other points of conduct in Mr. Farebrother which were exceptionally fine and made his character resem-
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ble those southern landscapes which seem divided between natural
grandeur and social slovenliness. Very few men could have been as
filial and chivalrous as he was to the mother, aunt, and sister, whose
dependence on him had in many ways shaped his life rather uneasily
for himself; few men who feel the pressure of small needs are so
nobly resolute not to dress up their inevitably self-interested desires
in a pretext of better motives. In these matters [Farebrother} was conscious that his life would bear the closest scrutiny, and perhaps the
consciousness encouraged a little defiance towards the critical strictness of persons whose celestial intimacies seemed not to improve
their domestic manners and whose lofty aims were not needed to
account for their actions (Chapter XVIII).
This is moral discourse that bristles with understanding. Is there anything
philosophy might do to help prepare people to think, speak, and write so
well about the moral life? S0ren Kierkegaard is sometimes regarded as a
philosopher, and his writings are rich in wisdom of this sort. A recent
book that I would also like to mention is Not the Way It's Supposed to Be: A
Breviary of Sin, by Cornelius Plantinga, Jr?
These writers have acquired an understanding of the moral life that
strikes me as an essential kind of understanding for a philosopher to have
- an understanding that is central to all moral understanding and ought
to precede any other intellectual inquiries concerning morality. Yet it
seems that few professionally trained philosophers, whether ethical theorists, meta-ethicists, problem-centered ethicists, or virtue ethicists, have this
kind of understanding in any unusually high degree. In the twentieth century, most mainstream philosophical ethics has not shown so much as an
interest in acquiring wisdom in this sense, and consequently has not
undertaken to find a way by which it might be fostered.

Exploring the Virtues
In the late 1960s I was studying at Yale Divinity School, and Paul
Holmer taught courses on such topics as "Emotions, Passions, and
Feelings" and "Virtues and Vices". In the catalog, these didn't fall under
the rubric of ethics courses, but it occurred to me, even at the time, that
they might have. And they were very different from anything that was
then being called ethics. Readings were from Aristotle, Augustine,
Aquinas, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, John Wesley, Jonathan Edwards, John
Henry Newman, and the more psychological writings of the analytic
philosophers of the time, Gilbert Ryle and Peter Strawson and many lesser
lights. The project was to do a bit of what Elizabeth Anscombe commends
in her "Modern Moral Philosophy"8, namely conceptual analysis of psychological concepts bearing on ethical life. The concepts of emotion, feeling, and mood loomed large, as well as particular emotion concepts like
remorse, awe, anxiety and peace, hope, and joy; pleasure and happiness
also came in for scrutiny, as did intention and action, and finally the concept of virtue and the concept of particular virtues such as temperance,
meekness, charity, and faith.
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It seemed to me then, and it still seems to me, that the concepts of the
particular virtues are the crown and center of this enterprise, and that the
other psychological concepts are of ethical interest insofar as they are players in the story that we tell about such virtues as generosity, faith, hope,
practical wisdom, patience, and humility. What is character ethics without
an understanding of the traits that constitute ethical character? Are we to
assume that no exploration is needed here because everybody's
understanding of these traits is perfectly clear and we know very well
what the virtues are? One of the wonders of philosophy, to me, is its ability to uncover arresting and enlightening features of concepts that we use
every day. It seems to me that one ethical service that philosophy can do us
is to give us a perspicuous and thus moving representation of the character
ideals of the moral life. If it can do that, then ethical philosophy can provide a strong voice calling us to live our lives well.
Joel Kupperman has contrasted character ethics with virtue ethics and
argued the superiority of character ethics. 9 If ethical analysis is focused on
individual virtues, says Kupperman, it will not clarify how a trait that is
designed for a particular kind of life-situation can have implications for our
attitudes and hehavior in other kinds of situation. For example, virtue ethics
cannot explain why a generous person is inclined to notice other people's
need for help, or how generosity affects a person's view of her social world
even in cases where generous behavior is not called for 007-108). Character
ethics, which in Kupperman's view does not center on individual virtues, is
capable of clarifying these matters, and so is superior to virtue ethics.
This is a bad argument inasmuch as it makes some very unrealistic or
invidious assumptions. It assumes that the analyst who focuses on
individual virtues does not notice the complex interconnections between
the trait she is presently analyzing and other virtues, and that she does not
notice that virtues are dimensions of a person's character, traits that go
more or less to the heart of the person as such. Thus the argument presupposes that the virtue ethicist has a very superficial understanding of
virtues. For it is surely part of the analysis of generosity to display the special perceptive capacities of the generous person, and to show how this
trait is not merely a disposition to emit outwardly "generous" behavior,
but a basic structure of personality or character, all tied up with perception,
judgment, and motivation. lO And it is surely a misconception of virtue to
think that a virtue like generosity can be understood in isolation from such
other virtues as justice, compassion, forgivingnesss, temperance, friendship, self-respect, and many others. If we have a good understanding of
what a virtue is, then to study character just is to study the virtues, and to
study the virtues is to study character. In a footnote to his argument,
Kupperman admits that if the thesis of the unity of the virtues were true,

virtue-ethics would be immune from the criticisms just leveled in the
text and would have no more disadvantages than does characterethics. Indeed, the two would become indistinguishable (13).
I think the expression 'the unity of the virtues' is misleading and has generated false claims. It is false to claim that a person cannot have any virtue
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without having all the virtues. It is empirically obvious that people differ
in the configuration of their virtues, and that some good people lack (in
some appropriate sense of the word) some of the virtues. The moral personality is not such a lock-step machine that if one cog is missing all the
other virtues grind to a halt. For example, a person might be unusally forgiving, and yet a glutton. And yet it is clear that the virtues are intricately
interconnected: the virtue of justice is likely to be compromised in a person who is short on generosity. As a judge, for example, such a person is
likely to have blind spots which more generosity or compassion would enlighten. So I prefer to speak of the "interconnection of the virtues" rather
than "the unity of the virtues." The virtues are interconnected in rich, various and complex ways, which may vary from one moral outlook to another, and which can be established and revealed, in detail, only through careful examination of individual virtues in their settings in particular moral
outlooks. But once these interconnections are displayed, the weaknesses
that Kupperman thinks he discerns in virtue ethics all disappear.
Kupperman's fear of focusing on particular virtues does rest on a sound
intuition, however, and that is that the moral life is necessarily an integration of its aspects. And this means that character ethics will not bear the
kind of fruit that I have been calling moral wisdom unless the philosopher
treats of a large enough range of virtues to facilitate the display of this
interconnectednesss of the psychological aspects of moral life.

What is a Virtue?
Novelists and essayists like Eliot and Johnson may become wise and
purvey their wisdom without much regard for the conceptual question,
What is a virtue? Maybe their wisdom is more "intuitive" than what we
expect from a professional philosopher. Philosophers who have explored
the virtues have typically leaned on one or another general theory of virtue. Such accounts have usually been reductivist, impeding the analysis of
the virtues while helping it. Every theory I know of captures something
about the nature of virtues, but at the same time hides from view some virtues and features of virtues that ought to be explored. I cannot even approach an exhaustive survey of theories of virtue here, but I want to look
briefly at three leading ones, as a background to proposing a nontheoretical way of exploring the virtues conceptually.
Aristotle defines a virtue as a disposition to experience passions and
perform actions in a mean. "A virtue is a disposition to choose, in a mean
relative to us, a mean determined by reason such as a wise person would
employ" (Nicomachean Ethics 1107a; my translation). Throughout his discussion he stresses the notion of the mean as defining virtue, and it is clear
that the concept of a mean is quantitative: "Now of everything that is continuous and divisible, it is possible to take the larger part, or the smaller
part, or an equal part, and these parts may be larger, smaller, and equal
either with respect to the thing itself or relatively to us; the equal part being
a mean between excess and deficiency" (1106a 28-29).11 The supposition
seems to be that actions and passions are among the things that are "continuous and divisible" (cruv£x~~ Kat Otatp£"tO<;), things whose wrongness
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thus consists in their being too large or too small in amount; and whose
rightness consists in their being in just the right amounts; relative to us.
But it seems awkward, at best, to suppose that the amount of an action or a
passion is the feature most relevant to its rightness or wrongness, and
therefore is the feature by reference to which the goodness and badness of
dispositions to actions and passions are defined.
Aristotle seems to feel the force of this observation, for he backs off from
his theory (while still asserting it). Thus he frequently switches to a qualitative interpretation of virtues, and offers it as though it is just a further
clarification of the theory of the mean. For example, soon after introducing
the mean he comments,
one can be frightened or bold, feel desire or anger or pity, and experience pleasure and pain in general, either too much or too little, and in
both cases wrongly; whereas to feel these feelings at the right time,
on the right occasion, towards the right people, for the right purpose
and in the right manner, is intermediate and best ... (1106b19-23)Y
But is it true that to feel emotions rightly is the same as feeling them in some
medium amount?13 Consider Evan, who has a strong sense of justice and
also a kind of humility that disposes him to put the interests of others ahead
of his own interests; and Louis, who is equally strongly concerned about
justice, but only as it relates to his own private concerns. And let us say that
they experience about equal amounts of anger, over a representative period
of time. (We can think of quantity of anger as a matter of frequency, duration, and intensity of anger episodes.) The difference between Evan and
Louis is in the occasions of their anger, the people they are angry at, and the
reasons for their anger. Much of Evan's anger is about injustices done to
other people. For example, he is angered about the corruption of public servants who siphon money away from feeding and education programs for
poor children. By contrast, when somebody maneuvers, at the last moment, into a parking place for which he has been patiently waiting a couple
of minutes, he shrugs off the injustice with little or no anger. Louis's anger
episodes are about equal to Evan's in frequency, duration, and intensity, but
he spends most of his anger on people who steal his parking places and on
neighbor children who are noisy when he's trying to attend to beer drinking
on his back patio; while he reads with equanimity about the theft of public
funds. In sum, we could say that Louis is disposed to morally trivial anger,
while Evan is disposed to get angry about significant wrongs. This example
shows that virtue with respect to anger is not a disposition to experience
anger in a mean, but to experience proper anger. If Aristotle thinks that
Evan's anger is in a mean but Louis's isn't, then his concept of a mean is
non-quantitative and eccentric.
The theory of the mean may be inspired by the virtue of temperance,
which as Aristotle construes it has to do with bodily appetites such as
food- and sex-hunger rather than with what we would call emotions (these
could all be lumped together under Aristotle's word 'rcu80<;'). The goodness and badness of bodily appetites may be more susceptible to a quantitative analysis (always relative to us, of course) than that of emotions. But I
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have doubts about this in the case of the sexual appetite. The virtue of
marital chastity (a form of temperance) probably does not consist so much
in mean sexual appetite, as in sexual appetite for the spouse and little or no
appetite for others. In other words, an analysis of temperance in terms of
right appetite seems more plausible than an analysis in terms of the mean.
The theory of the mean discourages Aristotle from recognizing virtues
that do not fit the schema. For example, he admits that the supposed
virtue of n:pao't'llC; (gentleness, mildness), which is a disposition with
respect to anger, is not on the mean, since persons with this virtue tend to
have less anger than is found on the mid-point between irascibility, which
is the corresponding vice of excess, and the unnamed extreme on the defect
side 125b27-1126a2). By contrast, the virtue with respect to anger does
not have a name (1125b27). IIpao't'llC;, not being a mean state, is not really
a virtue, "but seems to err on the side of defect" (1126al). But why think of
n:pao't'llC;, which seems to have been considered a virtue by Aristotle's
untheoretical contemporaries, as erring at all? Why should a virtue not fall
on the defect side of the mean between the anger-extremes? Aristotle's
reason for thinking that it cannot appears to be his theory of the mean. The
theory distorts Aristotle's philosophical eyesight a little bit.
It also seems to keep him from identifying as virtues dispositions that
empower a struggle against emotions. Courage, for example, might plausibly be thought to involve the ability to "handle" fears that are inappropriate in some way - either because they are disordered in themselves (say, a
fear of snakes that the agent knows to be harmless), or because they are
inconvenient in the circumstances (a fear of drowning might discourage a
man from trying to rescue a swimmer in trouble). The courageous person
would then be someone who can master such fears well enough to get on
with business. Guided by his doctrine of the mean, Aristotle says that "the
courageous person is he who endures or fears the right things and for the
right purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and shows
confidence in the same way" (1115b18).14 But even in this nonquantitative
interpretation, Aristotle's formula excludes such a power of self-management from the category of courage, since there will be no point in managing a fear unless it is in some way "wrong." In general, the doctrine of the
mean forces most" true virtues into the mold of temperance (crffiCPPOcrUV'll),
ruling out dispositions with the form of self-control (£YKa't£ta), though
Aristotle does recognize self-control as something like virtue and certainly
better than self-indulgence, vice, and bestiality. Self-control, he says, is
neither concerned with the same dispositions as virtue, nor does it belong
to a different genus than virhle (1145bl).
If for Aristotle self-control is only a sort of quasi-virtue, and the sense of
duty is not an Aristotelian virtue, for Kant virtue is paradigmatically a kind
of self control, in the service of doing one's duty.

o

Virtue is the strength of man's maxim in obeying his duty. All
strength is known only by the obstacles it can overcome; and in the
case of virtue the obstacles are the natural inclinations, which can
come into conflict with moral purpose.">
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Kant tells us that a maxim is the subjective principle of volition, as contrasted with the practical law, which is the objective principle. That is, a
maxim is the principle on which a person actually acts, or proposes to act,
as contrasted with the practical law, which is the principle on which he or
she ought to act.'7 So we might say that virtue is the strength of a person's
disposition to conform the maxims of his actions to the law of duty, in opposition to his natural inclinations. Accordingly virtue would seem to be
the disposition to attend to, and think in terms of, the categorical imperative, in such a way as to act in accordance with it. Kant agrees with classical accounts of the virtues in taking virtue to be acquired, rather than a
merely natural endowment like high IQ:
this capacity as strength (robur) is something that must be acquired
by upholding the moral incentive (the representation of the law) both
through contemplating (contemplatione) the dignity of the pure law of
reason within us and at the same time through exercise (exercitio) as
well.'"
To say that virtue is the strength of one's maxim in obeying one's duty is
not to say that every act of virtue is an act of self-control in which one
struggles and wins against one's natural inclinations; one can, after all, act
with strength without struggling, as when a strong man lifts a light or
medium-size weight. But it is to make acts of self-control paradigmatic of
virtue, and it is to say that all virtuous action is thought of and intended as
conforming to duty; that is, the subject of every virtuous act conceives his
action as dutiful.
Both consequences are reductivist. Surely Aristotle is right in thinking
that direct dispositions to right appetite and emotion, which do not require
moral strength for their exemplification, can be virtues. And it is better to
think of the sense of duty as one virtue among many than to suppose it the
form of all the virtues. To revert to our example of Evan, let us say that he
is angered by a news broadcast reporting official corruption in the management of poverty programs, and his anger leads him to undertake political
action aimed at legislation that will reduce such corruption. In so acting,
he may be doing his duty as a citizen, but his action will exemplify the
virtue of justice whether or not he thinks of himself as doing his duty. The
action exemplifies the virtue of justice by arising out of a concern that justice be done. Indeed, if he needs the motivation of considering the action
his duty, we may be less inclined than otherwise to attribute to him the
virtue of justice. On Kant's conception of virtue as the strength of one's
maxim in acting dutifully, virtues like generosity, compassion, and friendship, virtues that are heavily characterized by inclination, will either drop
out of the picture or get twisted.
David Hume offers an account of virtue that seems less theoretical and
more open to the whole range of virtues than the theories of Aristotle and
Kant. He proposes to apply "the experimental method" in moral philosophy, a method that contrasts with that of establishing "a general abstract
principle" and then deducing ethical conclusions from it - a pattern we
seem to see in Aristotle and Kant.
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Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems in
natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those
which are derived from experience. It is full time they should
attempt a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every
system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, which is not founded
on fact and observation. I"
He defines a virtue as any trait that pleases either its possessor or his associates, either immediately or because of its usefulness to them. But who
are this possessor and his associates supposed to be, and to which uses do
they propose to put traits? In effect, Hume is proposing that moral
philosophers use observational and descriptive methods much like those
of our own cultural anthropologists. But he does not recognize the relativistic implications of doing so. If we have learned anything from anthropology, it is that people's tastes in traits and their conceptions of utility
vary culturally. They also vary within a culture - at least they do within
ours. Whether a trait pleases somebody depends on the particular formation of that person's sensitivities and concerns. What appears laudable
generosity to somebody formed in one way may appear detestable improvidence to someone formed differently. To avoid this relativism Hume
must presuppose a "normal" generically human response pattern amidst
all the cultural and individual variety of moral formations. But to do so is
to be as theoretical, albeit in a very different way, as the deductivistic
moralists whom Hume wishes to relegate to pre-scientific history.
Among thinkers and traditions, the variety of tastes in traits is rather
principled, though not in such a way as to establish one pattern as
incontrovertibly superior to its rivals. As we look at the virtue ethicists and
traditions of the past, including Hume, we see that accounts of human
virtue presuppose a background of distinctive and controvertible suppositions about basic human nature. Some, if not all the virtues of the Stoic, the
Christian, the Aristotelian, the Kantian, and the Humean seem to be in the
service of actualizing human nature as so severally conceived. Thus it is
plausible to think that it is, at least partially, because of Hume's special
commitments concerning human nature that he finds the "monkish"
virtues of Christianity repugnant.>° Not being a creature of a personal God,
human nature does not, in his view, call for obedience and submission and
acknowledgment of a higher power as it does for Christians. Though
Hume admires the Stoics and often cites them, the Humean virtues are not
Stoic, because in his view of human nature "reason" does not have the
same function and dominance that it has for the Stoics. And a Christian
might find Hume's version of some virtues (e.g. of chastity) repugnant, or
at a minimum not very impressive as virtues. Christians will certainly find
some of the traits that please Nietzsche, because of his supposition that
human nature is basically a will to power, as repugnant as Nietzsche finds
many of the Christian and utilitarian virtues. No doubt some things are
pleasing to generic human nature - e.g. drinking water when thirsty but there may be no set of personal traits that are deep and complex
enough to count as virtues, that are pleasing to generic human nature.
I have not shown that no theory of virtue can be formulated that avoids
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artificially narrowing the array of virtues or distorting the nature of some
of them. However, I do mean to suggest this, as a speculation. Of course,
a general enough formula might cover all the cases. For example, "A trait
is a virtue if and only if it is acquired through some developmental process
and is regarded by some serious moral community as good." One might
object that this formula, and any like it, is not conceptually rich and particular enough either to count as a theory or to forward significantly our
analysis of virtues. But my case against theories is not just that all of them
are distorting. It is that even if we find one that is not, it will not be what
we need if our purpose as character ethicists is to understand the virtues.

A Nonreductivist Proposal
In contrast with all such theories I want to propose a way of examining
virtues philosophically that will, as far as possible, not foreclose any possibilities of what traits can be virtues or what features those traits can
include. Furthermore it will, I hope, yield a rich account of the internal
character of each of the virtues, from which we can learn the sort of
insights about the life of virtue that I earlier called wisdom.
I have suggested that virtues are highly influenced, in their internal
structure, by variations in moral outlook. What may appear to casual
observation to be a single cross-cultural virtue - say, courage as found in
a Homeric hero, an Aristotelian citizen, a Stoic, a Christian, and a Nietzschean - is not one virtue but five, commended for quite different reasons, with perhaps just enough overlapping features to justify speaking of
them all as versions of courage. Thus a great deal of vagueness, confusion,
and unhelpful generalizing can be avoided by indexing comments about
virtues to one moral tradition or another, speaking, for example, of Aristotelian courage and Christian courage, rather than just courage. Given a
particular moral tradition, then every virtue that figures in that tradition
has a rich internal logical and psychological structure the knowledge of
which is capable of being moral wisdom. I now propose a way of exploring and displaying that inner structure, a way that is recognizably philosophical, yet does not depend on any theory of the virtues as a background
for the exploration.
I propose that, instead of starting with a constricting definition or theory
of virtue, we start with a set of questions and suppositions which we
frankly own not likely to be all equally relevant to all the virtues, a pool of
questions that will help us to "look" and "see" how the virtues actually go,
in our tradition (or perhaps some tradition that is not our own). Here are
some questions that will aid in such a mapping.
1) What beliefs are presupposed by the virtue in question? In
particular, how is this virtue connected (if it is connected) to the picture of human nature and the world central to the moral outlook?
How would the virtue differ with changes in the conception of
human nature or the nature of the world?
2) How is this virtue connected with other virtues in the outlook?
For example, how is Aristotelian courage connected with Aristotelian
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justice, or friendship? How is Christian hope connected with compassion? Is it connected differently with this virtue than it is with
self-control?
3) How does this virtue differ from its counterpart in some other
moral outlook? How, for example, does Jewish generosity differ
from its Aristotelian counterpart, or Christian compassion from some
Buddhist counterpart?
4) Is the virtue associated with some single type of emotion? And
if so, how is it associated with it? Does it overcome the emotion? Is
having the emotion itself regarded as fulfilling, useful, or otherwise
good? Or nasty, counterproductive, or demeaning? In any case, under what conditions does the evaluation hold, and what is the rationale for it? What kind of object of the emotion is characteristic of
the virtue?
5) What kind of trait is the virtue, psychologically? Is it, for example, an emotion-disposition, a behavioral disposition, a skill of selfmanagement - or something else, or some combination of these?
6) To what kind of situation of life does the virtue apply? Financial transactions? Verbal or quasi-verbal reports? Situations of danger? Situations in which other persons depend on the individual in
question? Situations offering physical pleasure, personal honor?
7) What are the prepositions governing the virtue term and what
is their import? What kind of object does the virtue take? For example, for what is it virtuous to hope? Towards whom is one appropriately just? compassionate? generous? grateful? honest? kind?
loyal? friendly? ironical? About what is one appropriately courageous? generous? honest? proud? humble?
8) What kind of actions, if any, does the virtue issue in? In what
kinds of situations are the actions characteristic of the virtue in question overridden by actions belonging to some other virtue?
9) What range of motives is proper to actions exemplifying the virtue? For example, what motives are proper to generosity, and how
do these compare with the motives proper to justice or loyalty or
truthfulness? Why do courage and self-control seem to be more separable from any particular range of motives than, say, compassion
and generosity and forgivingness and justice? What about practical
wisdom? Are its acts motivated by a characteristic range of motives?
If not, why not?
10) What is (are) the counterpart vice(s) of this virtue in this moral
outlook, and what are its relations to it (them)?
11) Is the virtue in question central or peripheral, essential or dispensable, to the moral outlook? And whichever it is, why is it so?
12) What is it about the trait that qualifies it as a virtue? That is,
how would an insider to the moral outlook answer the question,
Why do you consider V to be a virtue?
13) How does the moral outlook explain how someone fails to have
the virtue in question? That is, what are the diagnostic concepts in the
outlook, and how do they bear on the particular virtue in question?
14) What are the strategies within the moral outlook for inculcat-
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ing, maintaining, or restoring the virtue in question (pedagogical
strategies, moral disciplines, therapeutic interventions)? Can you discern any internal relation between these strategies and the structure
of the virtue?
15) What are some traits that are likely to be mistaken for the
virtue in question, and how are they similar to it and how do they
differ from it? For example, how does Christian humility compare
with obsequiousness, submissiveness, self-effacement, obedience,
and deference? See Aristotle's discussion of courage (1116bI61117a29), where he distinguishes his version of courage from several
traits that can be mistaken for it.
These are of course just examples of questions. They overlap, and there are
no doubt others that could be fruitfully asked. One question tends to lead
to another, so some of the most interesting questions are peculiar to one
virtue or another, and may not occur to the philosopher until the conceptual analysis is well under way. A good grammarian or mapper of the
virtues has a sense for which questions to ask about the virtues, questions
that will really break open the moral outlook in its psychological dimensions and show features of it that will increase moral understanding. With
practice, one will get better at this inquiry. But it is also mind-expanding to
ask "weird" questions. Some of the above questions might be ones that
would not occur to us to ask in connection with some virtue or other that
we may be investigating. It may be enlightening, then, to consult the list
and ask intentionally those questions that seem not to be very natural or
promising, and be tenacious enough in our pursuit of answers that we
really see what an answer to them might look like, or perhaps gain a clear
understanding of why the question is inappropriate.
As I see this central task of the virtue ethicist, it is like that of an
exploratory cartographer who starts, not with a theory about what the land
he is exploring must be like, but nevertheless with some suppositions
about the likelihood that the sorts of things he will run into are woods and
meadows, rivers and their valleys, lakes and mountain ranges, and is sensitive enough to notice and identify differences between one river valley
and another, one kind of forest and another. Wisdom will be promoted by
our having little theory, a lot of sensitivity to our moral outlook, acquaintance with some other outlooks, a range of fruitful questions, a willingness
to ask weird questions, and a disposition to formulate more questions as
we go along.
Indispensable to the approach to moral philosophy that I am commending is examples of people who possess the virtues and vices. I don't
think we will get very wise if our grammar of the virtues remains quite
abstract and formal. It certainly has a formality, and that is expressed in
the idea of a grammar or logic; but we are talking about formalities that are
the shapes of real moral personalities. In doing this kind of analysis, one
needs to think about oneself, about family members and friends and other
people one has known well. A nearly indispensable aid is fine literature.
A great deal can be learned about moral personality from such authors as
Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Jane Austen, Leo Tolstoy, Fyodor
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Dostoievsky, William Faulkner, and Joseph Conrad. These authors understand the virtues and vices very well - though mostly not from the kind
of analytical angle that the philosopher takes - and they present richly
developed, or at least suggestive, characters in a narrative context.
Now I want to give you an example of the kind of work in moral philosophy that seems to me more likely than any other to promote the kind of
understanding that I am calling moral wisdom.

Example: The Virtue of Gratitude
In some, but not all moral frameworks, a disposition to feel grateful to
other persons in appropriate circumstances and to act on this emotion is a
virtue. Christianity is one of these frameworks. The following remarks are
examples of the conceptual mapping of a virtue, and you will notice that
each remark "places" gratitude relative to other concepts, some of which
are part of the analysis of gratitude and some of which are contrastive with
the version of gratitude that I am trying to identify and delineate. To give
a bit more of the impression of the skeletal or schematic or mapping nature
of what I am doing, I'll number the main remarks. The sentences following in the context are usually best taken as elaboration or explanation of
the numbered sentences. Identifying the skeleton in the way these numbers do serves not only to display the shape of the skeleton, but also the
way in which the skeleton by itself is not really wisdom, or if it is an
expression of wisdom it is not the form in which it is most likely to be conveyed or absorbed as wisdom. Beyond the skeleton is needed the flesh
that is created by imagination-captivating examples (important among
which are narratives), repetition in varied terms, clarifying metaphors, and
the utterance of the remarks in the living contexts of life and counsel.
1) To say that gratitude is a virtue is to say that it is an important dimension of the well-formed or mature person. If what I have said about mapping the virtues is correct, then we ought to be able to identify those features of gratitude that make it a virtue in Christianity though not in some
of the other frameworks. Conceptual analysis of the virtue should help
Christians understand more articulately this aspect of Christian existence
and consequently to feel the "call" to live this way. In this way, philosophy may contribute to Christian wisdom.
2) Gratitude the virtue is a disposition to feel the emotion of gratitude in
appropriate circumstances. 3) To experience the emotion of gratitude is
gladly to perceive some agenf l as giver of some benefice (gift or favor) to
oneself, and thus gladly to perceive oneself as a recipient of some benefice
from a benefactor, and thus as a kind of debtor. The concepts of giver,
recipient, gift, and debtor, in the particular ways they come together in the
concept of the virtue of gratitude, set the parameters for the grammar of
gratitude as a virtue. Let us continue with some remarks explicitly about
these foci of the perceptual state called gratitude, and move from there to
some other remarks.
4) One cannot be grateful to an agency construed in completely non-personal terms. Thus if one is grateful to a thunderstorm for watering one's
spinach, the storm must be (irrationally, as it may be) "personified". The
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reason for this is that 5) the gift is construed not just as something good,
but as a mark of the giver's generosity towards the recipient. 22 And of
course thunderstorms and the like do not intend to do us favors. Further,
6) there must be a distinction of property between giver and recipient, such
that the giver of gift or favor can deserve gratitude, and the recipient of gift
or favor can give it. So Ralph Waldo Emerson denies the propriety of gratitude between friends because "When the waters are at level, then my
goods pass to him, and his to me. All his are mine, all mine his. I say to
him, How can you give me this pot of oil, or this flagon of wine, when all
your oil and wine is mine, which belief of mine this gift seems to deny?"2?
7) Even more fundamentally, there must be a distinction of agency
between giver and recipient. As Thomas Aquinas says, " ... no one can really be thankful to himself, since thanks seems to pass from one person to another" .24 It also seems to follow from the concept of a gift or favor that 8) to
the extent that the giver's act is construed as exacting gratitude from the
recipient as an obligation, gratitude becomes impossible. To return a favor
out of a sense of duty is not to exemplify gratitude, though it may be to
exemplify justice, because the motive of duty goes with justice but not with
gratitude. Obviously, 8) rules out the virtue of gratitude for anyone, or any
moral tradition, that sees all moral issues as matters of rights and duties.
Nevertheless, 9) the grateful recipient construes himself as in debt to his
benefactor, that is, in a debt of gratitude.
We can distinguish debts of gratitude from debts of justice in the following ways. 10) A debt of justice is one that the creditor can demand to
be paid; a debt of gratitude is a debt that only the debtor can "demand"
that he pay. Thus it is a freely and gladly assumed debt. 11) A debt of justice is of a determinate amount, established by the value of something or
other, by agreement, or in some other way; a debt of gratitude is not
characterized by determinate amount, but by a "spirit" of reciprocity.
Thus a debt of gratitude can be paid with some very small token, as long as
the "spirit" is right, or even just by some token of this spirit, such as the
tone of voice or the look of a smile. 12) A debt of justice, when paid, is paid
off or discharged, and thus dismissed by the (former) debtor; while a debt
of gratitude, when paid, seems to the grateful person to remain. 13) A debt
of justice binds one to pay, while a debt of gratitude binds one to the benefactor. 14) Despite rules 10)-13), gratitude can be regarded as an obligation,
in the sense that people ought to be grateful for what they receive from
others. Not only is ingratitude as a trait a moral deformity that "ought," in
the interest of mature personality, to be corrected; ingratitude as a occurrent attitude or omission is a kind of injustice to the benefactor.
Further, 15) the recipient must be glad to be recipient of this gift. If he
finds the gift repugnant, gratitude is not possible, though an emotion neighboring on gratitude is compatible with disliking the gift: If a dear friend,
out of manifest affection, gives me a gift I hate (say, a velvet Elvis framed in
a $700 carved Brazilian rosewood frame with built-in lighting, that must be
prominently displayed because of her frequent visits to my home), while I
cannot be exactly grateful for the gift, I can be glad for the "thought" which is to say, glad of my friend's good will and the meaning this has for
our relationship. Likewise, 16) the recipient must be glad to receive this gift
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from this person, and thus to be bound to this person by the debt of gratitude. If the recipient finds repugnant the prospect of being indebted to this
particular giver, then gratitude is not possible. In this case, the recipient can
be glad to have the gift, though anxious about or repulsed by or indifferent
or oblivious to the meaning that it has for his relationship with the giver.
For example, Will Ladislaw, in George Eliot's Middlemarch, is indebted to
the "generosity" of his cousin Mr. Casaubon, but because he hates him
wishes he could dispel the debt after the manner of a debt of justice:
"He's a cursed white-blooded pedantic coxcomb," said Will, with
gnashing impetuosity. His obligations to Mr. Casaubon were not
known to his hearer, but Will himself was thinking of them, and
wishing that he could discharge them all by a checque (about half
way through chapter 22).
So persons who do not like to be bound to anyone in a relationship of
indebtedness or dependency cannot have the virtue of gratitude, for they
will lack a basic aspect of this disposition. 17) It is possible to be fully grateful to someone for something, without being properly grateful. For a gift or
favor may appear to be good, and a benefactor may appear to be a good
one to be dependent on for some gift, without these appearances' being
veridical. 18) Practical wisdom, as it arises in connection with one virtue or
another - e.g. justice or chastity - allows a person to discriminate proper
from improper objects of gratitude. After a public reading of a version of
this paper, one audience member asked whether, if one of the participants
at the meeting should offer herself sexually to some male participant, he
should feel grateful. In this case, if we are speaking within a context of
Jewish or Christian virtues, the virtue of chastity rules out the candidate
objects of gratitude. A friendly offer of this kind by an attractive person
can seem to present a genuine benefice by an appropriate benefactor, thus
justifying the two gladnesses required by 15) and 16). But the chaste person will see that what is offered is in fact not good, and that the proposed
benefactor is not a good one to receive this benefice from. Thus he will not
be able to feel grateful for this favor, except as a moral lapse, and irrationally. The capacity to perceive as good what is good and as not good what is
not good is part of practical wisdom, and in the present case is a dimension
of the form of temperance called chastity.
19) Gratitude, being an emotion-disposition, can supply a motive, in
contrast with some other virtues. One can, for example, act out of gratitude, by way of expressing one's gratitude; but there is no such thing as
acting out of courage or self-control (one acts with courage or self-control).
20) To have the virtue of gratitude it is not enough to feel gratitude once or
very occasionally. The virtue of gratitude is a settled disposition to feel the
emotion of gratitude on appropriate occasions; thus a regular failure to feel
the emotion, in situations that call for it, betokens a lack of the virtue.
The above remarks are probably true in every morality in which gratitude appears as a virtue. But it is not a virtue in every morality, and where
it is a virtue it may have special grammatical features that are not shared
between moral outlooks. For example, in Christianity 21) all gratitude,
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even to human benefactors, is normatively also gratitude to God, since all
benefits are ultimately referable to God. Thus, rigor will require that some
remarks displaying the grammar of gratitude be indexed to some particular tradition.
Gratitude is not in Aristotle's list of virtues, since it is incompatible with
the central Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity. Gratitude is a happy
acknowledgment of indebtedness to another, while Aristotelian magnanimity is an awareness of and insistence on self-sufficiency. Aristotle even tells
us that "the magnanimous are thought to have a good memory for any benefit they have conferred, but a bad memory for those which they have
received (since the recipient of a benefit is the inferior of his benefactor,
whereas they desire to be superior)" (1124b13-14)?5 Aristotle's view leads us
to formulate another remark: 22) Gratitude is not a virtue unless it is sometimes good to be a debtor, to be dependent on the freely given benefits of
another. A virtue resembling gratitude might exist in an outlook in which
being indebted to another is never good in itself. For example, a mere disposition to acknowledge debts verbally (a form of politeness) might be a
good trait in such a morality, because by gratifying creditors it promotes
helpfulness in the community. But this virtue will differ from gratitude,
which is a disposition to be glad about one's indebtedness to certain other people.
Such an emotion would have to be irrational and thus vicious in strict
Aristotelian ethics. Conversely, the Christian will regard the magnanimous
man's disinclination to acknowledge his dependency on and indebtedness to
others as signaling the vice of ingratitude. Thus what is a virtue in the
Aristotelian scheme is a vice in the Christian one, and vice versa.
Christianity is more aggressive than most moral outlooks in stressing the
goodness of being a debtor inasmuch as according to the Christian scheme
people are creatures of a personal God; our very life is a gift, and we are created to be indebted to one another and to enjoy that mutual indebtedness.
Gratitude has an even more elemental supposition than that expressed
in rule 22), namely that 23) gratitude cannot be a virhw unless it is possible
for one person to be indebted to another for significant goods. Aristotle
thinks it possible but demeaning to be so indebted; a rigorous Stoicism
thinks it impossible. Stoics think things that can be transferred from one
person to another - what I have been calling gifts and favors - are neither good nor bad, since the only things that are good or bad are attitudes
and states of character.26 It also follows from the Stoic commitment to the
virtue of a,1tCXSEtU - a disposition not to feel emotions in response to "externals" - that gratitude, as an emotion-disposition, would not be a virtue.
Our exploration of gratitude has shown it to be a response to circumstances that meet certain nom1ative criteria. Thus it does not fit all circumstances, but only ones in which some gift is given or favor done to oneself,
and in which the motive of the giver is generous. But in Christianity 24) it
is fitting in all circumstances to feel gratitude, since the circumstance of
God's having given us eternal life in Jesus Christ prevails in and transcends all the lesser, daily, changing circumstances of our life. The
Christian is disposed to give God thanks for what in almost any outlook
would be regarded as goods - adequate food and shelter, physical safety,
health, the well-being of family and friends, meaningful work, and free-
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dam of movement and speech - but the Christian sees the goodness of
such goods in the enhanced light of God's generosity in Christ. In the spiritually mature Christian the sense of God's generosity is so pervadingly
transforming that even when the "ordinary" goods of life are wrenchingly
absent - when physical dangers beset us, when we are oppressed by enemies, when our children are destroyed - we may be able to see God's
goodness upholding us. Heartfelt gratitude in such contradictory circumstances is rightly thought to be a special grace of God's holy spirit, beyond
anything that merely human devices of moral formation could achieve.

Sources and Form of Wisdom
I have sketched a way of thinking philosophically about ethical topics
that may have some promise of helping moral philosophy to be a source of
wisdom. Two assumptions lie behind this hope: First, conceptual clarity
about the nature of the virtues is a significant part of moral wisdom. And
second, philosophical work, when applied to virtue concepts, can remind
us of the nature of the virtues, bringing to articulate awareness features of
the moral life, as our tradition understands it, of which, through poor training, we may be only dimly aware, or about which we may have become
forgetful or dulled.
Moral wisdom, as I have referred to it throughout this paper, is a keen
understanding of the moral life. 'Keen' is a nicely ambiguous word for my
purpose, inasmuch as it can mean both finely discriminating and passionately
interested. The edge of a knife is keen when it can cut a fine slice, and a person is keen on something when it grips her. Morally these two kinds of
keenness are inseparable. To be finely and appropriately discriminating,
one must care deeply about the objects of virtue; and one cannot care
deeply about the very objects of virtue, without being pretty discriminating. I have suggested that the virtue concepts of any moral tradition supply a basis for the needed discriminations, and many of the virtues are
themselves forms of moral interest.
Philosophical analysis is better suited to refining conceptual powers than
to engendering moral enthusiasm, and so even analysis that is focused on
the virtue concepts does not guarantee a contribution to moral wisdom.
Aristotle holds that only those whose desires and habits of action are ethically well formed will benefit from ethical knowledge 0095'5-10), and that
therefore a person's early upbringing is crucial (making, as he says, "all the
difference") to the formation of character (1103 b 7-25). I think that philosophy's conceptual reminders, if expressed well, can arouse dormant moral
interests and thus activate character that is already there, and so contribute,
in an auxiliary way, to our moral enthusiasms. But Aristotle's point remains: Unless we have picked up the basis for wisdom before we come to
philosophy, philosophy will not help us to be morally wise.
The basic sources of moral wisdom are the gentle guidance and correction of parents in a setting of supporting love, membership in a moral
community where the language of the virtues and vices is spoken well and
the reality of the virtues is manifest in senior models, the individual initiative and action of the moral learner in deeds that exemplify the virtues, and
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the mysterious special working of God.
A few times in this paper, I made one mark of moral wisdom the power
to "call" the thinker or hearer to virtuous action and feeling. And the
examples I cited from Socrates, the Stoics, Dr. Johnson, and George Eliot all
have an element of rhetorical appeal, sometimes very simple and sometimes not so simple. The style of the thought and language seems to lend
itself to the calling function; it speaks to the heart. In particular the use of
narrative, and of examples and references suggesting fuller narratives,
seems to playa key role in this power to arouse the moral sentiments and
motives without which moral communication is incomplete.
By contrast, my twenty-four grammatical remarks about the virtue of
gratitude seem rather thin, formal, intellectual, dry-bones analytical, and
unedifying, despite being very much about a "matter of the heart." They
remind us more of St. Thomas Aquinas than they do of Soren Kierkegaard.
This points to the limitation of maps and grammars. Grammar is no substitute for the fullness of living language, and reading a map is no substitute for exploring a region in person. Indeed, a map is not even a substitute for a well written travelogue. Yet the map gives us an orientation in
the region it depicts that very large amounts of wandering and exploring
that region at ground level might not give. And delineations of the kind
that St. Thomas specializes in can provide an analogous orientation in the
regions of moral space.
The point is that wise discourse is a synthesis of the abstract and the concrete, of the map and the travelogue, of logic and rhetoric, of the grammar
of the virtue concepts and the narrative examples that put discursive flesh
on that grammatical skeleton. Prerequisite to the highest sort of moral wisdom is to be both a philosopher and a story teller. I conclude, then, that
philosophy, if it is directed at the central questions of ethics -- questions
like "what is gratitude?", "what is justice?", "what is faith?", and "what is
truthfulness?" - can be an essential discipline in the development of
moral wisdom. But it is not the whole storv, for it needs to be accompanied by moral passion and concrete moral i~agination.
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have and express to one another; and so it is important that friends have things
(of their own) to offer one another.
24. Summa Theologia?, 2a2ae, 106, ad.3. A few lines later he formulates an
odd rule, which perhaps derives from this one: "A slave has no claim to gratitude, since in his very person he belongs to the master." The idea seems to be
that the slave as agent is just an extension of his master's will, so that when he
does good for the master it is as though the master is doing good for himself.
25. Rackham's translation, p.223, altered. Contrast Seneca's rule: "The rule
for doing favours is that one person quickly forget what he has given, and the
other long remember what he has received" (quoted in Aquinas' Summa
Theologier 2a2ae, 107(3).
26. We must not attribute an artificial consistency to people's moral lives,
and it is possible that people may have the virtue of gratitude "irrationally,"
that is, without the kind of warrant from a morality that Christian gratitude
has. Thus a Stoic might be a grateful person. In friction with my thesis about
Stoicism, Seneca has many perceptive things to say about gratitude. See his On
Benefits (De Beneficiis), volume III of Moral Essays tr. John W. Basore (Cambridge, Mass: The Loeb Classical Library, 1975).

